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Abstract 
 
‘Financialisation’ and ‘shareholder value’ loom large in the closure of the Vaux 
Brewery in Sunderland. ‘Financialisation’ and ‘shareholder value’ are 
necessarily intertwined with the geographies of space and place. Geography 
inevitably enters into assessments of shareholder value by social agents. A 
geographical political economy approach argues that generalised pressures 
created by financialisation and shareholder value are mediated and contested 
by specific and particular configurations of spatialised social relations, social 
agency and socio-institutional contexts over time, across space and in place. 
Geographical political economy frames the analysis of the Vaux Brewery 
closure in Sunderland. A more spatially sensitive, place aware and locally and 
regionally rooted financial infrastructure may be necessary but not sufficient to 
underpin local and regional development. 
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Introduction 
 
After over 160 years of operation, the Vaux Brewery in Sunderland in North 
East England closed in July 1999. Over three hundred people lost their jobs, 
many with over two decades of service. The Vaux Brewery was a material 
part and an iconic symbol close to the metaphorical and physical heart of the 
City of Sunderland. As Industrial Chaplain Canon Brian Hails put it: “Vaux is 
Sunderland, Sunderland is Vaux” (Author’s Interview, 2001). The closure 
meant the end of a longstanding association since 1837 between the brewery 
and the city. Growing from its initial regional roots, by 1999 the Vaux Brewery 
was part of The Swallow Group plc following its own diversification into hotels 
from the 1960s. Attempting to meet the rising expectations of its institutional 
shareholders for increasing investment returns, The Swallow Group decided 
to exit brewing and buy beer from the open market as part of its refocused 
business model of hotels and managed pubs. Amid contested assessments of 
‘shareholder value’ and profitability, the Swallow Board rejected a 
Management Buy-Out (MBO) led by the local brewery management in favour 
of the closure and asset disposal advocated by their advisors and supported 
by their major institutional shareholders based in the City of London. This 
decision met with a vigorous but unsuccessful local anti-closure campaign. 
The economic and social costs of closure contributed to the North East 
region’s relatively weak and uneven economic growth, persistently high 
unemployment and lack of home grown, regionally-based companies. 
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The Vaux Brewery closure in Sunderland begs an explanation and provides a 
stark illustration of the potential power and local and regional development 
implications of the geographies of ‘financialisation’ and ‘shareholder value’. 
The relative neglect of the economic geographies of money is being 
incrementally addressed (Martin and Minns 1995; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; 
Martin 1999; Tickell 2000; Pollard 2003). However, the intersection and 
articulation between the circuits of finance and industrial capital and their local 
and regional development implications has received limited attention (Linge 
and Schamp 1993; Courlet and Soulage 1995; Martin and Minns 1995; Martin 
1999). In particular, there are only limited insights into “the nature and 
processes of firms’ exits from markets and the role of irrecoverable sunk 
costs” (Clark and Wrigley 1997): 10). 
 
This paper seeks to address the gaps in the literature by examining the 
geographies of ‘financialisation’ and ‘shareholder value’. The geographies of 
space and place are necessarily intertwined with financialisation and 
shareholder value. The process of financialisation and the phenomenon of 
shareholder value take place in an explicitly spatial framework. Geography 
inevitably enters into the assessments of shareholder value by social agents. 
A geographical political economy approach reveals that generalised 
pressures created by financialisation and shareholder value are mediated and 
contested by specific and particular configurations of spatialised social 
relations, social agency and socio-institutional contexts over time, across 
space and in place. Geographical political economy frames the analysis of the 
closure of the Vaux Brewery in Sunderland. It explains the disembedding of 
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regional social relations of ownership and control, the corporate quest for 
relatively higher returns and City support through post-industrial business 
models, institutional struggles over competing assessments of shareholder 
value and corporate strategy and the social agency of local and regional 
interests contesting the closure and dealing with the aftermath. A more 
spatially sensitive, place aware and locally and regionally rooted financial 
infrastructure may be necessary but not sufficient to underpin local and 
regional development. 
 
 
The Geographies of ‘Financialisation’ and ‘Shareholder Value’  
 
An increasingly finance-driven capitalism has become a markedly more 
pervasive phenomena reshaping geographies of finance in recent decades 
(Grahl 2001; Clark 2004). Williams explains its emergence as process of 
“financialization” that: 
reworks the hierarchy of management objectives as it reorients the firm: 
if firms have to organize process and please consumers in the product 
market, they must also now satisfy professional fund managers and 
meet the expectations of the capital market. The result is a new form of 
(financial) competition of all against all whereby every quoted firm must 
compete as an investment to meet the same standard of financial 
performance (Williams 2000): 6). 
‘Financialised’ forms of capitalism have their roots in the crisis of the post-war 
era of Keynesian welfare capitalism, the retreat of the state and the 
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emergence of neo-liberalism and ‘pension fund capitalism’ (Clark 1999). The 
deregulation and liberalisation of the financial system and corporate 
governance since the 1980s heralded a ‘securitized’ era of market 
development in which commodification and marketisation have reached 
unprecedented levels (Martin 1999; Leys 2001; FinancialReportingCouncil 
2003). Institutional investors have become dominant shareholders within 
national equities markets (Table 1), directing the state-assisted savings boom 
since the 1960s (Clark 2000). The power and voice of owners has been 
reinforced in their principal-agent relationship with management 
(Christopherson 2002; Clark 2004).  
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
For companies, ‘financialisation’ has established the conditions in which “the 
financial system now completely dominates the real economy of goods and 
services” (Martin and Minns 1995: 128). Industrial capital now has few 
institutional protections against the “peremptory demands of the stock 
exchange” (Williams, 2000: 4). For people, wider private shareholding and 
personal savings, especially pensions (Blackburn 2003), have closely 
connected individuals and households with the financial system (Boyer 2000). 
Social relations and social identities have divided. People can be 
simultaneously workers and shareholders, directly through share ownership 
and indirectly through institutions investing their savings (Table 2).  
 
<Table 2 here> 
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‘Shareholder value’ has emerged from and contributed to financialised 
capitalism as the main measure of firm performance and dominant framework 
for management agency (Williams 2000). As the “business cliché” and “social 
mantra” of the 1990s (Froud et al. 2000: 81) and “the investment community’s 
contemporary anthem” (O’Neill 2001: 189), ‘shareholder value’ is:  
not so much a precisely defined concept with a stable place in one 
discourse or politico-economic system, as a rhetoric which circulates 
widely and a thematic which can be variably invoked as cause, 
consequence or justification … [it] has been variously characterized as 
epochal revolution or mere fad and quite possibly is both (Froud et al., 
2000: 81). 
Shareholder value originated in the US in the 1980s amongst a management 
consultant community attempting to sell value-based systems to publicly 
quoted companies seeking to increase returns and satisfy (rising) stock 
market expectations (Rappaport 1998; PAConsulting 2004). Despite 
discussion of ‘stakeholder capitalism’ (Wills 1998; Gamble and Kelly 2001), 
‘shareholder value’ reinforces the dominance of shareholders as the principal 
‘stakeholder’ with a claim on the firm through the social relations of ownership 
(Minford 1998). Management often has a fiduciary duty to maximise financial 
returns to shareholders legally entrenched in national financial systems. For 
advocates, shareholder value “will align management and shareholder 
interests to benefit all stakeholders as shareholding is spread ever wider” 
(Froud et al., 2000: 86). 
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‘Shareholder value’ is enacted through ‘Shareholder Value Added’ (SVA) 
methodologies that assess the ‘economic value added’ of future corporate 
activity rather than ex-post reporting. SVA focuses on:  
determining the extent of a firm’s available (or free) cash flows as the 
means to pay dividends, meet debt obligations and access capital for 
new investment opportunities. SVA methodologies construct a powerful 
accounting and management language which expresses the 
aspirations of shareholders, ensures the collaboration of managers and 
acts both as a motivational and a disciplining device throughout the 
enterprise (O’Neill 2001: 190). 
Expectations of increased returns on capital employed in shorter time periods, 
perhaps to more than 10% annually with no sectoral exceptions, are typical 
SVA performance yardsticks (Williams 2000). With the virulent forces of the 
capital market via institutional investors more “mobile and rapidly threatening” 
than the product market through retailers and consumers (Froud et al. 2000: 
104), companies and management often struggle to meet such expectations 
for returns. Speculative deal-making by impatient investors has often 
displaced patient interest in longer-term organic growth, reinforcing short-
termism (Martin and Minns 1995; HMTreasury 2001; Blackburn 2002; Hutton 
2002). 
 
Shareholder value’s ‘speed-up’ (Froud et al. 2000) of management work has 
unleashed a dynamic of perpetual restructuring:  
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resources are shifted to areas where returns can be maximized, 
making other investments redundant…the break-up of vertically and 
horizontally integrated firms, discarding or selling poorly performing 
investments — where the loss of earnings produces higher savings 
than the cost of capital employed (O’Neill, 2001: 190). 
During a closure, tensions may emerge from such restructuring as “…what 
worker/shareholders lose through wage cuts could be compensated by the 
gains of shareholder/workers in asset price appreciation” (Williams 2000: 9). 
 
Financialisation and shareholder value are necessarily intertwined with the 
geographies of space and place. Despite growing attention in social science 
(Froud, Haslam, Johal and Williams 2000; Grahl 2001; Rose and Mejer 2003) 
and economic geography (O'Neill 2001; Christopherson 2002; Engelen 2003), 
the explicitly spatial framework in which the process of financialisation and the 
phenomenon of shareholder value take place warrant further consideration. 
The geographical embeddedness of the financial system is well established 
(Harvey 1989; Corbridge, Martin and Thrift 1994; Leyshon 1995; Clark and 
O'Connor 1997; Leyshon and Thrift 1998; Martin 1999; Clark 2004). 
Generalised pressures — such as financialisation and shareholder value — 
are inevitably reproduced, interpreted and transmitted amongst geographically 
rooted financial networks with specific spatial structures and particular 
geographies (Leyshon and Thrift 1997). Echoing the fallacy of O’Brien’s ‘end 
of geography’ arguments (O'Brien 1992), finance-driven capitalism may be 
more autonomous relative to the ‘real’ economy but it cannot escape its 
inherently geographical foundations (Harvey 1982; Harvey 1989). National 
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‘varieties of capitalism’ with distinctive material and social characteristics 
guide company behaviour and mediate financialisation and shareholder value 
in particular ways (Hall and Soskice 2001; Christopherson 2002). 
 
Geography inevitably enters into assessments of shareholder value. The 
difference that space and place can make to corporate financial performance 
is necessarily bound up with expectations and judgements about current and 
future prospects. Interpretations of shareholder value by City institutions and 
company management contain inherent sensitivity to geographical conditions 
and the material nature of industries and sectors. Such understandings may 
or may not be recognised and expressed whether explicitly or implicitly. Funds 
managers typically demand close scrutiny of the geographies of the 
companies in which they invest because they impinge upon financial 
performance. The geographical attachments of the firm and its assets can 
provide advantages and disadvantages central to future growth prospects. 
Such geographical influences can be taken into account to greater or lesser 
degrees in assessing their relative contributions to shareholder value added 
(Table 3).  
 
<Table 3 here> 
 
Yet, SVA methods are not wholly rationalist and objective. Neither is the ‘City 
of London’ a unified, homogenous and faceless entity (Leyshon and Thrift 
1997). SVA contains inherent subjectivity. ‘The City’ is divided, heterogeneous 
and works through people and institutions. Analyses, decisions and 
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judgements about shareholder value are articulated in particular ways for 
specific ends by a range of agents – advisors, analysts, brokers, institutional 
shareholders or corporate managers (Table 3). Geographical concerns 
impinge upon the actions and intentions of social agents in different ways in 
different times and places. Geographically-framed narratives may be used 
discursively to influence and shape the agency of institutional investors, 
companies and other involved interests. Institutional investors in the City of 
London may seek to portray regional companies as poorly run, under-
performing relative to their sectoral peers and ripe for change. Regionally-
based management could try to preserve their strategic autonomy despite 
shareholder dissent. National, regional and local branches of the state may 
seek to safeguard jobs through regional policy while being unable or unwilling 
to intervene in the financial affairs of publicly owned companies. Trade unions 
could be torn between the workplace politics of safeguarding members’ jobs 
and the community politics of their pension fund trustees seeking returns on 
investment (Harvey 1996). Local civil society may or may not mobilise 
successfully to contest the decisions of apparently remote institutional owners. 
The geographies of financialisation and shareholder value therefore unfold in 
uneven ways across the range of inter-dependent, socially constructed and 
contested scales – shaped by geographically and historically resilient global 
centres of co-ordination and control such as the City of London (Leyshon and 
Thrift 1997; Clark 2002). A geographical political economy approach provides 
a means of explaining such geographies of financialisation and shareholder 
value. 
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A Geographical Political Economy of ‘Financialisation’ and ‘Shareholder 
Value’ 
 
Geographical political economy interprets generalised pressures — including 
financialisation and shareholder value — as mediated and contested through 
specific and particular configurations of spatialised social relations, social 
agency and socio-institutional context over time, across space and in place 
(Beynon, Hudson and Sadler 1994; Allen, Massey and Cochrane 1998; 
Perrons 2000; Hudson 2001; Goodwin 2004; Pike 2005). Geographical 
political economy integrates economic, social, political and cultural concerns 
and sees capitalist economies as “contested via a complex mix of social 
relations, of understandings, representations, and interpretations, and 
practices” (Hudson 2004): 3; Leyshon and Thrift 1997). It goes beyond the 
mutually exclusive logic that economic geography’s basic explanatory 
categories should become: “social power, cultural identity, and institutional 
situatedness rather than economic ownership, universal definitions, and 
individual agency” (Barnes 1999): 17). Building upon its integrative traditions 
(Goodwin 2004), a holistic geographical political economy interprets such 
concepts as mutually constitutive and enriching. Analysis needs to “…remain 
sensitive to the fact that however much financial flows and geographies are 
socially embedded, culturally inflected, discursively mediated, and 
symbolically inscribed, financial geographies are also geographies of power 
and are critical in moulding the quality of people’s lives” (Tickell 2000: 243). 
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The integrated and holistic view of geographical political economy is sensitive 
to the geographical particularities and material specificities of production, 
circulation and valorisation recognised by Marx (Smith, Rainnie, Dunford, 
Hardy, Hudson and Sadler 2002). Geographical political economy 
emphasises the actual, potential and emergent role of social agency to 
acquiesce, contest and/or shape structural forces as they unfold over time, 
across space and in place. Financialisation and shareholder value do not set 
in train processions of inevitable events. Co-operation, division and contest 
are possible concerning assessments of shareholder value and how to 
achieve it as capital and labour take myriad institutional forms and are 
differentiated by class, gender, ethnicity, social character and history (Massey 
1995; Schoenberger 1997; O'Neill and Gibson-Graham 1999).  Geographical 
political economy incorporates the socio-institutional context of specific and 
particular configurations of spatialised social relations and social agency 
(Sunley 1996; Clark 2004). Particular national varieties of capitalism endure 
and mediate generalised pressures in specific and meaningful ways – 
encapsulated in the distinctively uneven geographies of British capitalism, 
finance-industry relations and the City of London (Thompson 1977; Ingham 
1984; Thrift 1994; McDowell 1997).  
 
As a production facility within a national hotels and managed and tenanted 
pubs company run from its headquarters in North East England, the Vaux 
Brewery closure in Sunderland provides an empirical case to examine the 
geographies of financialisation and shareholder value. The Vaux episode 
encapsulates the struggle between the divided fractions of finance and 
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industrial capital, the social agency of capital, labour, the state and civil 
society and the socio-institutional context of finance-industry relations 
between the City of London and a provincial firm in an old industrial region in 
the periphery of Britain. Geographical political economy utilises empirical 
research to reveal the particular articulations of contested, restructured and/or 
reproduced spatialised social relations, the mobilisation and articulation of 
social agency and the shaping of socio-institutional context over time, across 
space and in place (Fagan and Le Heron 1994; Allen et al. 1998; Sayer 2000). 
Analysis examines the incremental and sequential nature of corporate 
decision-making (Clark and Wrigley 1997: 343), the contested financial 
narratives situated in specific socio-institutional contexts (O'Neill 2003; Yeung 
2003), the critical role of City analysts in producing ‘financial knowledges’ 
(Wrigley, Currah and Wood 2003) and “costs and cash” (Sayer 1997): 22). 
The research comprised analysis of semi-structured interviews with key 
agents (e.g. management, trade unions, and institutional shareholders) and 
published and unpublished secondary materials (e.g. reports and accounts).  
 
 
Calling Time on Wearside: The Closure of the Vaux Brewery in 
Sunderland 
 
The Vaux Brewery produced beer distributed through managed and tenanted 
pubs in the North East and Yorkshire and Swallow Hotels nationally. By the 
late 1990s, it operated as the brewing and distribution division within The 
Swallow Group that employed nearly 7,000 nationally, including 3,000 in 
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North East England (SwallowGroupplc 2000). The Vaux Brewery’s importance 
went beyond jobs and beer in Sunderland and Wearside and it was 
considered: “the heart of the company” (Former Brewery Division Director, 
Author’s Interview, 2001). By the late 1990s, three generations of the 
Nicholson family had managed Vaux with their particular style of paternal, 
dynastic and regionally-rooted capitalism embedded within the North East’s 
historic class structures (Austrin and Beynon 1997). ‘Fair treatment’ and 
‘mutual respect’ were integral to Vaux’s corporate culture: “paternalistic 
capitalism…looking after people, customers [was a] better way to deliver 
value to shareholders” (Former Chairman, Author’s Interview, 2001). Further, 
“…the interests of those working for us can sometimes be as, or more 
important than maximizing profit. A company based in this town [Sunderland], 
with its 14% male unemployment is very conscious of the needs of the area” 
(Paul Nicholson, then Chairman and Chief Executive quoted in (Nicholson 
2003): 80). 
 
Disembedding the regional social relations of ownership and control 
The Vaux Brewery originated in Cuthbert Vaux and Sons in Sunderland in 
1837, a private company until flotation in 1927. The group led the 
consolidation of regional breweries and vertically integrated on the back of 
industrialisation and a largely working class ale drinking clientele in its North 
East heartland. Vaux’s evolution incorporated diversifications, often to reduce 
dependence upon a contracting regional market following deindustrialisation 
from the 1960s (Figure 1). Pubs and hotels worked contra-cyclically to support 
corporate growth (Nicholson, 2003). By the late 1990s, The Swallow Group 
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was a vertically integrated brewing, hotel, managed and tenanted pubs 
business, including the Vaux, Sunderland, and Wards, Sheffield, breweries. 
 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
Brewing’s increasing capital and scale intensity generated investment capital 
needs beyond the reach of retained earnings or, in a threadbare regional 
capital market, North East regional investors. Mirroring the historical loss of 
financial independence to London (Martin and Minns 1995), capital demand 
drew the company into the City’s capital markets. By 1999, Swallow had 
approximately 12,000 shareholders, including 8,000 private individuals and 
2,000 employees. None held a controlling share. Fifteen institutional 
shareholders owned over two thirds of Swallow, concentrated amongst two of 
the City’s largest fund managers (Table 4). Down from a historic high of 50%, 
the remainder were often small shareholders, many based in North East 
England. In the late 1970s, a typically paternalistic employee share ownership 
scheme issued 6% of the final share capital and made 66% of employees 
‘worker/shareholders’, although many sold their shares immediately. The 
Nicholsons owned less than 1% of Swallow. Annual dividends, low risk and 
steady performance meant index tracking pension funds held shares, 
including those of the Vaux employees. 
 
<Table 4 here> 
 
As a relatively small regional brewer, ongoing concentration in brewing meant 
constant take-over speculation and a volatile share price for Vaux (Figure 2), 
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fuelled by increased institutional ownership and their impatience with organic 
growth’s relatively slower returns. In the North East’s branch plant economy, 
the Nicholson management’s regional attachment meant that it: “…would fight 
fiercely to preserve this [Vaux’s] independence, if this was threatened by a 
predator from outside” (Nicholson 2003): 80). Take-over threats kept 
management ‘on its toes’ but absorbed effort building defences rather than 
developing the business (Nicholson 2003). Historically, increased annual 
dividends and profits, except during the 1991-94 hotel downturn, maintained 
shareholder loyalty. Driven by specific sectoral and particular regional 
circumstance, Vaux experienced the disembedding of its regional social 
relations of ownership and control through the concentration of its share 
ownership amongst City of London institutional investors. Vaux transformed 
from a regionally-owned to a regionally-managed concern. By the late 1990s, 
its particular spatialised social relations were stretched and intertwined within 
the socio-institutional context of institutions and capital markets in the City. 
 
<Figure 2 here> 
  
Shareholder value and post-industrial business models: from brewing to 
hotels and managed pubs 
Ever since the successful 1960s diversification, The Vaux Group’s corporate 
strategy has wrestled with balancing brewing and hotels. The Nicholsons 
resisted exiting brewing since the 1970s. By the late 1990s, unprecedented 
concentration transformed regional brewers’ prospects. Four increasingly 
international brewers held over 75% market share (CompetitionCommission 
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2001). National market maturity and falling ale demand (Figure 3), combined 
with increasing capital and scale intensity and rising productivity, generated 
over-capacity and job loss. Closures meant the total number of breweries in 
the UK fell from 142 to under 80 between 1980 and 1998. Demand shifted to 
lager and specialised market segments (e.g. premium strength) and from on- 
(pubs, clubs) to off-trade (domestic). Market power swung towards retailers 
following the PubCos’ rapid growth after the national brewing groups enforced 
tied houses sale under the 1989 Beer Orders (Competition Commission 2001). 
 
<Figure 3 here> 
 
Increasingly impatient for shareholder value and drawing upon specific 
sectoral knowledges, City analysts interpreted brewing as an ‘old’ economy, 
mature sector facing structural limits to its potential returns in slow growing or 
declining markets, especially without internationalisation in growing markets 
such as Brazil, China and Russia. Brewing retained its large appetite for 
capital, tied up in assets creating sunk costs and barriers to exit, but could 
only deliver steady returns. Vertical integration between production and 
distribution was uncompetitive given the market prices set by the international 
brewing groups’ oligopoly. Regional brewers were too small without 
established, premium priced national brands (e.g. Greene King) and/or private 
ownership insulating them from City capital markets (e.g. Fullers). Searching 
for City investor support, many brewing groups exited brewing and refocused 
on the potentially higher returns in hospitality and leisure-based businesses. 
Underpinning ostensibly objective analysis of high capital base and low return 
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sectors, market participants remain vulnerable to shared, fashionable and 
transient expectations amidst the ‘herd behaviour’ in the City institutions’ close 
knit world (Clark 2004). 
 
For institutional investors: “the City is completely indifferent to geography…it 
is only of relevance where it makes a difference to company 
performance…that depends on the business and the locale…location has no 
relevance (Author’s Interview, 2001). This inherent geographical sensitivity 
and place awareness in assessments of shareholder value was demonstrated 
as analysts saw Vaux as: “a far flung business but the City has nothing 
against businesses run in the provinces. It makes no difference where they 
are located. Problems arise where North East companies proclaim their 
regional roots and fail to recognise the interests of the institutional investors” 
(Author’s Interview, 2001). Sectoral knowledge is fundamental too as “All 
companies are judged via their sectoral peers”. Analysts interpreted Vaux as 
under-performing in its sector - “disappointing” and “pedestrian” – with a 
“totally inadequate” return on capital employed and “a good hotel business 
trying to emerge despite the Nicholson management” (Institutional Investor, 
Author’s Interview, 2001).  
 
The geographical location and scope of Vaux’s business necessarily 
influenced assessments of its future growth and earnings potential. Vaux’s 
brands were considered too regional and dependent upon inflated transfer 
prices from its weakly performing tenanted pubs estate in the North East’s 
small and low value market. An institutional shareholder even suggested that 
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Vaux’s annual dividend increases might have been better reinvested in the 
brewing operation. For City investors, exiting brewing and asset disposal 
would boost shareholder value, sustain Swallow’s share price and deter 
potential predators. A service-based company with a national hotels brand 
and managed pubs buying cheaper beer on the open market was sustainable 
and capable of delivering relatively higher returns.  
 
The quest for shareholder value and City support was shaped by economic 
imperatives restructuring the brewing industry, the particular spatialised social 
relations of ownership and control and the social agency and particular 
assessments of sectoral analysts and institutional investors in their specific 
socio-institutional context in the City of London. City interests sought Vaux’s 
transformation from under-performing brewing industrialism to potentially 
better performing service post-industrialism — further disconnecting finance 
and industrial capital. Geographical and sectoral sensitivity inevitably 
influenced the economic assessments of shareholder value. City institutions’ 
discursive views established the material context and constrained the Swallow 
Board’s agency in considering its options. 
 
Social agency and socio-institutional context I: the boardroom struggle - 
closure versus Management Buy-Out (MBO) 
As City sentiment turned against brewing, investors scrutinised Swallow’s 
strategic juncture and "sought information rather than attempting to wield a big 
stick” (Author’s Interview, 2001). The Chief Executive described their 
involvement as “…benign, consistent pressure. Not aggressive”; the 
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Chairman felt a “short termist, powerful…external stimulant to change” 
(Author’s Interviews, 2001). Historically, in a further manifestation of particular 
British finance-industry traditions, Vaux’s investor relations comprised City 
open days in London since: “analysts and institutions were increasingly 
reluctant to come north” (Nicholson 2003: 166). Since the 1980s, the post-‘Big 
Bang’ political economy and culture of short-termist deal-making by “plain 
spivs” (Nicholson 2003: 154) in the City of London was increasingly at odds 
with the Chairman’s brand of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’. 
 
Limited succession planning and City investors’ dislike of internal candidates 
eventually led to a new Chief Executive’s recruitment from leisure group Allied 
Domecq. This ‘outsider’ was steeped in the City mores of shareholder value 
and appeased City interests but was alien to Vaux’s culture. Supported by 
City advisors, the subsequent strategic review concluded The Vaux Group 
should exit brewing, change its name to ‘The Swallow Group’ and refocus on 
hotels and managed pubs. Institutional shareholders argued that the Vaux 
Brewery should already have relocated:  
Decentralisation to Dunston [Gateshead]. Redeveloped the Sunderland 
site. Made the business more viable. But it stopped in Sunderland 
therefore the only option was closure due to overcapacity. If, 15 years 
ago, Vaux went for a modern, ‘out of town’ smaller capacity brewery 
employing fewer people then they may still be brewing. They missed 
their chance (Author’s Interview, 2001).  
The then Hotels Division MD argued that such alternative strategies were 
“sacrificed at the altar of brewing” under the Nicholson leadership (Author’s 
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Interview, 2001). Following the Board decision to exit brewing, the breweries 
and tenanted pubs were put up for sale. Numerous bidders emerged. The 
MBO led by Frank Nicholson and the local management was most significant. 
Financed by a City venture capital group, it emphasised its competitive 
productivity, flexible workforce, consensual industrial relations and regional 
standing. Their initial offer — £70m for the breweries and the ‘bottom’ 300 
pubs from the 664-strong estate — secured an exclusive negotiating period in 
early 1999. 
 
Seeking closure and asset disposal of the brewery and pub business to 
maximise shareholder value, the Chief Executive and Finance Director 
allegedly mounted a whispering campaign that the MBO represented a 
regional, Nicholson family “stitch-up” to gain control of the brewery “on the 
cheap” (Author’s interview, 2001). Such claims rankled with the City 
institutions’ dislike of family dynasties and suspicion that Vaux was being 
inefficiently managed as a “private fiefdom” (Institutional Shareholder, 
Author’s Interview, 2001). The City rumour mill culminated in an influential Lex 
column in The Financial Times questioning the independence of decision-
making, critical of the MBO’s viability and government intervention and 
supportive of closure and asset disposal.  
 
Rattled by the unsolicited public attention, the Swallow Board dismissed the 
executives responsible. The Hotels Director became Chief Executive. The 
brewery’s situation appeared salvageable. However, amid discussions leaning 
toward the rejection of the bid, the MBO sought consideration for sale of the 
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brewery and all the pubs for a figure in excess of £125m. This proposal was 
rejected without discussion alongside Board claims of offers over £125m just 
for the pubs. Small size, regional brands, licensed lager brewing, inefficient 
vertical integration, ‘over-manning’ and heavy capital investment needs for 
modernisation further questioned the MBO’s viability. The Sale Committee’s 
advisers developed competing assessments of shareholder value for the 
Board’s deliberation. Noble Grossart – “never part of the City ‘mafia’” 
(Nicholson 2003: 141) - supported the MBO. City-based Bankers Trust Alex 
Brown (BTAB) claimed more shareholder value from closure and asset 
disposal. A total of £6m in regional policy grants was offered to safeguard 
employment, narrowing the valuation between the MBO and asset disposal. 
 
Invoking legally enshrined fiduciary duties to shareholders, institutional 
investors insisted the “Nicholsons were trying to buy it for t’pence 
ha’penny…[it was] unjustified for directors to take the business at anything 
less than the full amount of market price. Otherwise it was cheating the 
shareholders” (Author’s Interview, 2001). The Swallow Board demurred to 
City advice and rejected the MBO’s revised offer. A £30.5m difference was 
claimed alongside a public statement that a £10m gap would have been 
acceptable. The Chief Executive claimed a “rigorous process” examined all 
the options in shareholder as well as stakeholder interests (Extraordinary 
General Meeting (EGM), Newcastle Upon Tyne, 15 July 1999). The Chairman 
suggested the Board opted for closure as a “macho and City heroic move to 
incur the wrath of the region” despite potential alternatives for shareholder 
value and the breweries (Swallow Group EGM, 15 July 1999). An institutional 
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investor claimed closure: “would create more jobs. Different sorts of jobs in 
housing and retail. An opportunity for the regeneration of the city rather than 
clinging to a decrepit Victorian brewery taking up a large city centre site” 
(Author’s Interview, 2001). The Chairman resigned amid accusations that a 
weak and divided Swallow Board were “anxious to please their Gods in the 
City” (Author’s Interview, 2001). Further, it was claimed BTAB’s assessments 
of the asset disposal proceeds were flawed and over-optimistic, dissuading 
interest from other buyers, damaging goodwill and the MBO’s prospects.  
 
The institutional struggle between the Chairman, MBO team and Noble 
Grossart versus the City institutional investors, BTAB and the remainder of 
the Swallow Board revolved around competing assessments of shareholder 
value and corporate strategy. Confrontation between the divided fractions of 
financial and industrial capital — each with differing degrees of attachments to 
particular places — revealed the ways in which the imperatives for enhanced 
shareholder value were mediated and contested by particular configurations 
of spatialised social relations, social agency and socio-institutional context 
embedded in North East England and the City of London. That closure and 
asset disposal prevailed underlined the social power of City institutions and 
the Swallow Board’s constrained social agency, notwithstanding the attempts 
of local and regional interests to contest the closure. 
 
Social agency and socio-institutional context II: local and regional interests 
contesting the closure 
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Mobilising cross-class alliances, Sir Paul Nicholson’s regional ‘poison pill’ 
takeover defence instead came to fruition in the struggle against the Vaux 
brewery closure. The Nicholsons and Vaux’s historically close identification 
and North East standing were built upon their commercial, social and political 
networks; deeply and pragmatically embedded in place: “a more prosperous 
North East would mean a more prosperous Vaux” (Nicholson 2003: 81). A 
broad community politics (Harvey 1996) — dormant since the 1980s 
Wearside shipyards’ demise — mobilised an anti-closure coalition. Campaign 
for Real Ale (CAMRA) launched the ‘Save Our Breweries, Save Our Beer’ 
campaign. The Bishop of Durham and Sunderland’s Industrial Chaplain 
convened a meeting of the relevant interests but it was dismissed by the 
majority of institutional investors as “a distraction from trying to maximise 
economic value for our client shareholdings rather than support a ‘lame duck’ 
industry in Sunderland” (Author’s Interview, 2001). The Bishop of Durham 
encapsulated the worker/shareholder dilemma for trade unionists whose 
pensions might be more secure “at the expense of jobs in the North East of 
England” (Tyne Tees, 1999).  
 
CAMRA, Durham County Council, MPs and The Sunderland Echo sought an 
explanation and vote but their shareholdings were less than the 10% 
necessary to trigger an EGM. An institutional investor even acknowledged it 
“could have looked beyond the narrow financial calculus” if acting for local 
authority clients otherwise they had to “step back from local views” (Author’s 
Interview, 2001). The Vaux Tenants Association petitioned the Swallow Board 
to support the MBO and made a co-operative bid for the tenanted pub estate. 
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The Swallow Board had, however, already sold all the pubs to Pub Company 
Pubmaster for £127.5m – finally severing the brewery’s distribution network. 
Sunderland Football Club’s matchday ‘Red Card’ protest triggered a changed 
sponsorship deal, despite earlier (with the City Council) switching their beer 
supplies to Scottish and Newcastle and undercutting Vaux’s historical local 
market. Politically, local MP Chris Mullin secured a House of Commons 
debate but MP and shareholder Derek Foster’s City consortium bid failed to 
materialise. The TGWU supported the MBO and anti-closure campaign.  
 
Against the closure, the Nicholsons mobilised Sunderland City and North East 
community politics. Despite their collective efforts, the social agency of local 
and regional interests unsuccessfully contested the power of the social 
relations of ownership, exercised through the City institutional investors that 
circumscribed the agency of the Swallow Board in their decision to pursue 
closure and asset disposal. The particular spatialised social relations, social 
agency and socio-institutional context were challenged and mediated the 
generalised pressures for shareholder value producing a particular outcome 
for the brewery and the city. 
 
The closure aftermath: from brewing to flats, offices and shops? 
As the Vaux brewery closed, local poet Little Billy Craggs opined “Vaux waaz 
mare than just a brewery…It waaz our culture, our community” (The Brewery 
Tap, 30 June 1999). The Brewery Director bemoaned: “160 days to lose 160 
years of history” (CAMRA Conference Speech, 2001). The former Chairman 
saw “corporate vandalism”:  
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For both the institutional investor and the corporate financier, short-
term shareholder value is their life’s blood…It often seems that they 
forget that it is people out there, making widgets or beers, running pubs 
or hotels, that actually make the profits, in the long term, not the short 
term wheeling and dealing…Their worship at the altar of ‘shareholder 
value’ leads all too often to short termist pressures on the companies 
they invest in (Nicholson 2003: 189, 204, 155). 
Rather than seeing “the City versus the workforce” (Institutional Investor, 
Author’s Interview, 2001), the major investors claimed they were fulfilling their 
fiduciary responsibility to shareholders — including Vaux employees. Over 
three hundred (330) relatively highly paid manufacturing and ancillary jobs 
were lost, compounded by the less well-paid alternative employment 
opportunities in call centres and retail in Wearside. The TGWU negotiated 
enhanced redundancy settlements, considered overly generous by Swallow’s 
non-executive directors. The Nicholsons received settlements too as 
worker/shareholders. Swallow Group claimed 70% of employees found new 
jobs by October 1999. Despite outplacement consultants and an Employment 
Service ‘Job Shop’, press reports suggested “less than half” and labelled it a 
scandal (The Journal, 2 July 1999).  
 
…profitability is not a technical, objective term but is specifically related 
to the structure of British capitalism, the role of financial institutions, 
and their ability to concentrate on short-term returns. Profitability is 
political (Minns 1982): 48). 
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Reflecting historic issues of unreliable accounting (Cooper and Hopper 1988) 
and recent post-Enron unease about the probity of financial reporting 
(Blackburn 2002), the Vaux Group accounts (1998) register a brewing division 
profit of £4.3m. The Swallow Group accounts (1999) show losses of £2.6m 
(1998) and £3.4m (1999) explained by reducing the higher internal transfer 
price to ‘market levels’. Confirming the brewing division’s contested 
profitability, the independent auditors did not sign off this page of the accounts.  
 
Sir Paul Nicholson’s (2003) analysis of the closure’s actual proceeds and 
costs reveals the out-turn was over £15m less than BTAB estimated (Table 5, 
total Col. 2 less total Col. 3). The gap between the value of the final MBO 
proposal and closure/asset disposal was claimed to be £31.4m but this was 
based on over £15m of over-estimated proceeds. The real difference was 
closer to £15m – only £5m more than the £10m difference the Swallow Board 
publicly claimed would have been acceptable. The City adviser’s estimate 
contained £15m of ‘shareholder value’ that failed to materialise.  
 
<Table 5 here> 
 
City analysts’ initially positive assessment now saw Swallow’s unencumbered 
hotels business as small for its sector and likely to struggle to meet capital 
market expectations. The Board’s claim to an independent future vanished 
following the take-over that historically haunted Vaux. Uncontested, 
Whitbread acquired Swallow for £578m as part of its UK leisure market 
leadership strategy. Swallow shares ceased trading on 13 April 2000 at a 
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historic high of £3.88. A further 200 jobs and a regionally-based plc were lost, 
reinforcing the North East’s branch plant economy. Swallow Group’s financial 
position was subsumed into Whitbread’s accounts. Wrangling continued as 
redundant site owners Whitbread held out for a rumoured £20m, and then 
sold to supermarket group Tesco against the post-industrial strategic 
redevelopment intentions of the Sunderland ARC Urban Regeneration 
Company and the City Council. 
 
Through damaging local and regional economic implications, the aftermath of 
the Vaux Brewery closure reveals contested and illusory assessments of 
shareholder value and the further disembedding of the regional social 
relations of ownership following the acquisition of a regionally-based plc by a 
national leisure group. Struggle remains unresolved between the financial 
interests of Plcs, under pressure to generate shareholder value for their 
institutional investors, and the responsible public authorities over the strategic 
regeneration of the redundant brewery site. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In contributing to the currently limited work on the intersection of finance and 
industrial capital and local and regional development, a holistic and integrative 
geographical political economy approach has been used to examine the 
geographies of financialisation and shareholder value. It is argued that 
generalised pressures generated by phenomena such as financialisation and 
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shareholder value are necessarily shaped and contested by specific and 
particular arrangements of spatialised social relations, social agency and 
socio-institutional contexts over time, across space and in place. The 
assessment, discursive expression and material utilisation of shareholder 
value are inevitably spatial. Geographical sensitivity is inherently intertwined 
with processes of financialisation and the articulation of shareholder value. 
Financialisation and shareholder value are discourses built and 
communicated in and through space and place, specifically the geographically 
embedded financial system and particularly the City of London. 
 
The geographical political economy approach examined the geographies of 
financialisation and shareholder value to analyse the Vaux Brewery closure in 
Sunderland. The findings revealed, first, the disembedding of the regional 
social relations of ownership and control caused by the concentration of 
shareholding amongst institutional investors in the City of London, the specific 
sectoral conditions of brewing’s capital and scale intensity and the particular 
regional circumstance of the investment capital dearth in de-industrialising 
North East England. Such changes were tempered by the paternalistic 
capitalism of the Nicholsons’ dynastic family management and their 
pioneering worker/shareholder ownership schemes.  
 
Second, the corporate quest for relatively higher investment returns and City 
support through post-industrial business models revealed that the economic 
restructuring imperatives and the drive for enhanced shareholder value were 
mediated by City advisors’ specific sectoral assessments of brewing 
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industrialism and particular evaluations of Vaux’s prospects. The geography 
of Vaux’s location and reliance upon its regional market directly influenced the 
assessment of its financial prospects. The analysts promoted the exit from 
brewing, the further disconnection of finance from industrial capital and the 
service post-industrialism of hotels and managed pubs as the route to 
relatively higher investment returns. A powerful socio-institutional context was 
discursively constructed, framed by the institutional investors embodying the 
social relations of ownership, which circumscribed the corporate social 
agency and material actions of Vaux’s management. 
 
Third, the decision to exit brewing triggered institutional struggles over the 
competing assessments of shareholder value and corporate strategy in the 
MBO or closure and asset disposal options. Yet, this was not a story of 
faceless, monolithic and remote City institutions undermining mature industrial 
firms in peripheral regions. The geographical political economy analysis 
revealed how generalised pressures were contested amongst divided factions 
of capital within the firm and its advisors with differing degrees and kinds of 
attachment to Vaux, the North East region and the City of London — the 
Chairman, MBO team and Noble Grossart versus the institutional investors 
and advisors in the City and the Swallow Board. The social relations of 
ownership and social power of the institutional investors were decisive in 
constraining the social agency of corporate decision-making — shaped by the 
necessarily geographical sensitivities and particularities of socio-institutional 
context. 
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Fourth, the social agency of local and regional interests mobilised a 
community politics unsuccessfully to contest the closure. Not wholly 
orchestrated by the Nicholsons but supported through their social and political 
networks, the coalition encompassed a range of cross-class and sectional 
interest groups. Sunderland City Council was limited by its contingent and 
particular local circumstance, dealing with remaining Swallow Group 
businesses. The state’s support, through Government Office North East, 
remained behind the scenes. Activism through the social relations of 
ownership was thwarted by insufficient shareholdings and voice vis-a-vis the 
major City institutions.  
 
Fifth, dealing with the aftermath revealed the contested and illusory nature of 
shareholder value, the further disembedding of the regional social relations of 
ownership following Whitbread’s acquisition of Swallow and the unresolved 
struggle between the corporate owners and responsible public bodies over 
the redundant brewery site’s regeneration. The particular British tradition of 
finance-industry relations between the City of London and firms embedded in 
peripheral regions has been exposed but left fundamentally unchanged by the 
Vaux episode. Over-optimistic assessments of shareholder value have proven 
illusory for the City and firms alike. Productive assets have been destroyed, 
jobs lost and local economies damaged in parallel with the lower than 
estimated realisation of shareholder value.  
 
What, then, of policy and politics for local and regional development in an era 
of financialisation, shareholder value and City dominance? For Williams, the 
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Anglo-American form of shareholder value is not a “realizable project” for 
management:  
whose corporations are caught on a fundamental contradiction 
between what the capital market requires and the product market 
allows (at least without special-case advantages of immateriality or 
intellectual property rights). The result…is a redoubling of management 
effort…an intensification of all forms of restructuring (such as horizontal 
merger, divestment and downsizing) which in different ways swap high 
and low ROCE activities, reduce the capital base and sweat out labour 
for usually transient gains (2000: 6). 
Such systemic dysfunctions that privilege shareholder/worker relations are 
inherent in capitalism’s crisis tendencies and are animating discussion about 
the limits of financialisation and shareholder value (Kennedy 2000; Hutton 
2002). Radical responses argue that within regulatory strategies “must be an 
element of de-commodification or socialisation, since only this can ‘neutralise’ 
the floating electric charge of capital by tying it to the ‘earth’ of mutual or 
public property, which can no longer be bought and sold” (Blackburn 2003: 
502). The ‘associative entrepreneurship’ of a worker-owned co-operative 
(Cato 2004) or trade union-sponsored pension fund may have provided 
alternatives to anchor the capital in place and save the brewery. But, like the 
failed MBO, any anti-closure coalition voices making claims on Vaux’s future 
(O’Neill and Gibson-Graham 1999) would have had to return to the capital 
market with the necessary investment to acquire ownership of the assets in 
order to convert them into mutual and/or public property. Building a spatially 
and sectorally sensitive, place aware and locally and regionally rooted 
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financial infrastructure to provide such alternative finance presents a 
formidable challenge. However, it may offer a means of localising the capital 
base and providing institutional bulwarks against the demands of globalised 
capital markets concentrated in the City of London (Martin and Minns 1995). 
Such decentralised ‘financial localism’ may only be a necessary rather than 
sufficient support to local and regional development, however, due to its 
ambiguous relationship with economic growth, questionable scope and 
sustainability and susceptibility to financial crises (Martin 1999; Tickell 2000). 
Commitments by the state and civil society to alternative conceptions of the 
corporation that invite contestation (O’Neill 2003) and consideration of the 
“proliferation of alternative possibilities for regional futures and corporate-
community relations” (O’Neill and Gibson-Graham 1999: 20) are sorely 
needed to support experiments that challenge the dominance of shareholder 
value in the regions. 
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Table 1: Share ownership (%) in the UK equity market, 1963-2003 
 
Institution 1963 1975 1981 1989 1994 1997 1998 1999 2003 
Pension Funds 6.4 16.8 26.7 30.6 27.8 22.1 21.7 19.6 16.1 
Insurance 
Companies 
10.0 15.9 20.5 18.6 21.9 23.5 21.6 21.6 17.3 
Unit and 
investment 
trusts, financial 
instruments 
12.6 14.6 10.4 8.6 10.1 10.6 9.0 9.7 15.4 
Banks 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.0 2.2 
Total UK 
institutions 
30.3 48.0 57.9 58.5 60.2 56.3 52.9 51.9 51.0 
Individuals 54.0 37.5 28.2 20.6 20.3 16.5 16.7 15.3 14.9 
Other personal 
sector 
2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.2 
Public sector 1.5 3.6 3.0 2.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 
Industrial and 
commercial 
companies 
5.1 3.0 5.1 3.8 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.2 0.7 
Overseas 7.0 5.6 3.6 12.8 16.3 24.0 27.6 29.3 32.3 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: (NationalStatistics 2003): 9) 
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Table 2: Social Relations and Social Identities 
 
Social Relations Social Identities Linkage/articulation 
Employment/ownership 
 
Worker/shareholder Firm/capital market 
Ownership/employment Shareholder/worker Capital market/firm 
 
Source: Based upon Boyer (2000) 
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Table 3: Examples of geographical influences in the assessment of 
shareholder value added 
Geographical issues Influence upon the assessment shareholder value 
added 
 
Firm and asset location - valuation of saleable assets (e.g. buildings, capital 
equipment, land) 
- sunk or irrecoverable costs 
- brands (e.g. international, national, regional) 
 
Workforce - quality of management 
- employment levels (e.g. ‘headcount’) 
- productivity 
  
Markets - geographical spread (e.g. international, national, 
regional, local) 
- market dynamics (e.g. declining, growing, static) 
 
Industry - geographies and performance of sectoral peers 
- technological change and diffusion 
 
Financial and monetary 
context 
 
- macroeconomic policy 
- fiscal policy (e.g. taxation) 
 
Regulatory environment - degree and nature of state intervention 
- competition rules (e.g. mergers and acquisitions) 
- market regulation (e.g. market access and trade) 
- protection of trademarks and intellectual property 
rights 
- labour market regulation and employment 
protection 
 
Political conditions - political system stability 
- enforcement of private property rights 
- government politics and policy 
 
 
Source: Author’s research 
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Figure 1 : Corporate Evolution of the Vaux Brewery, 1837-1999 
 
Year Main Company Acquisitions and Mergers Disposals and Closures 
 
   
1837 C. Vaux   
1871 
 Founding of Castle Brewery 
(Sunderland) 
 
1919 
 Lorimer & Clark’s Caledonian 
Brewery (Edinburgh)** 
 
1927 Associated Breweries 
Ltd. 
North Eastern Breweries plc  
1934 
 Berwick Breweries*  
1937 
 Ridley, Cutter and Firth 
(Newcastle) 
 
1943 Name changed to Vaux 
and Associated 
Breweries Ltd. 
  
1947 
 Hepworth & Co. (Ripon) 
Whitwell, Mark & Co. (Kendal) 
 
1954 
 Steel, Coulson & Co. 
(Edinburgh) 
 
1959 
 Thomas Usher & Son 
(Edinburgh) 
 
1961 
 John Wright & Co (Perth)  
1964 
  
John Wright & Co (Perth) 
1972 
 S.H.Ward & Co. (Sheffield)  
1973 Vaux Breweries Ltd.***   
1974 
 Liefmans (Belgium)  
1978 
 W. M. Darley Ltd. (Thorne)  
1979 
  Lorimers Brewery (formerly 
Thomas Usher & Son) 
following disposal to Allied 
Breweries 
1980 
 Trident (Tyne Tees TV) (20%)  
1981**** 
 Fred Koch Brewery (New York 
State, US) 
 
 
1984 
  Fred Koch Brewery (New 
York State, US) 
1985 Vaux Group plc   
1986 
  Caledonian Brewery 
(Edinburgh) MBO 
W. M. Darley Ltd. (Thorne) 
Liefmans (Belgium)                          
1987***** 
   
1990 
  Wines & Spirits Division to 
Greenalls (now de Vere) 
Trident (Tyne Tees TV) 
Care Homes Division 
1999 Swallow Group plc   
1999 Acquisition by 
Whitbread****** 
  
 
* Brewery closed & site retained as bottling plant. ** Sir Paul Nicholson’s Grandfather’s independent 
purchase.  *** Swallow Hotels Division established. **** Off-license division (Blayney & Co.) established. 
***** Care Homes Division (St. Andrew’s Homes Ltd.) established. ****** Whitbread acquired 15 
breweries between 1960-1990. 
 
Source:  Nicholson (2003), (Richmond and Turton 1990). Frank 
Nicholson (Personal Communication, 2004). 
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Table 4: Top 15 Institutional Shareholdings in Swallow Group, 1999* 
Fund Manager Holding (No. 
of Shares) 
 
% Value (£)**** 
Phillips and Drew** 26,312,908 17.90 80,254,369 
Mercury Asset Management*** 18,741,682 12.75 57,162,130 
Britannic Assurance 8,810,585 5.99 26,872,284 
Perpetual 7,730,053 5.26 23,576,661 
Caledonia Investments 6,844,413 4.66 20,875,459 
Legal and General  5,507,509 3.75 16,797,902 
Prudential 5,126,456 3.49 15,635,690 
Barclays Global (UK)  3,341,441 2.27 10,191,395 
Company 2,914,874 1.98 8,890,365 
Equitable Life 2,772,170 1.89 8,455,118 
Standard Life 2,279,379 1.55 6,952,105 
United Friendly 1,970,615 1.34 6,010,375 
Henderson 1,968,941 1.34 6,005,270 
Axa Sun Life 1,544,397 1.25 4,710,410 
Hermes 1,774,274 1.21 5,411,535 
    
Total Top 15 Institutional 
Shareholdings 
97,639,697 66.63 297,801,075 
    
Total Shareholdings 146,540,142 100.00 446,947,433 
 
* As of 2 March 1999. ** Union Bank of Switzerland. *** Merrill Lynch. **** 305 
pence per share (1999 average). 
Source: Swallow Group PLC 
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Figure 2: Vaux and Swallow Group Share Price, 1964-2000 
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Source: Datastream (2003) 
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Figure 3: UK beer market, 1960-1998 
 
 
 
Source: Beer and Licensed Retailers Association 
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Table 5: Estimated and actual out-turn from The Swallow Group exit from brewing 
 
 Pre-Closure Estimates* 
(£000s) 
Out-turn** 
(£000s) 
Net Position 
(£000s) 
Asset realisations    
Loans 21,500 17,398 (4,102) 
Net working capital 2,851 (420) (3,271) 
Plant and equipment 5,393 4,300 (1,093) 
Brands*** 0 885 885 
Properties 11,561 14,548 2,987 
Sub-Total 41,305 36,711 4,594 
    
Costs    
Severance**** 11,794 15,876 (4,082) 
Rundown 0 807 (807) 
Onerous contracts and legal fees 5,245 7,046 (1,801) 
Site clearance 625 125 500 
Site security, insurance and skeleton staff 580 580 0 
Accountancy and debt collection 0 463 (463) 
Moving of equipment (IT, etc) 0 500 (500) 
Tax recoverable (8,332) (4,833) (3,499) 
Sub-Total 9,912 20,564 10,652 
    
Total 31,393 16,147 15,246 
 
* March 1999 from BTAB’s ‘Mid-column’ of the ‘Brewery Closure — Option Evaluation’ document. ** March 2002. *** Including the sale of the ‘Double Maxim’ brand to a local spin-off micro brewer 
led by a former Vaux employee and the sale of other Vaux brands to regional brewers, including Samson to Federation, Waggle Dance to Youngs, Scorpion lager to Wolverhampton and Dudley and 
Lorimers to Caledonian. **** Including redundancy, notice pay, Directors notice pay, outplacement services and costs of early retirement charged to pension fund. 
 
Source: Nicholson (2003: 230-237) 
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